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It has been asserted that the Islamic Republic’s notion of “soft war” is in essence a paranoid 
argument. But, as the saying goes, there are often good reasons for paranoia. In Iran’s case, these 
reasons include the real, decades-long attempts by U.S. administrations and others to subvert the Islamic 
Republic by using extensive funds and new communications technologies. Tactics have included 
assassinations, cyber attacks, increasingly severe economic sanctions, and more. Recently, President 
Obama has tried to limit Tehran’s influence in Latin America, leaving it up to the U.S. State Department to 
formulate a policy to counter Iranian presence in the region. And it is indeed the case that the Islamic 
Republic is modeling its internal and external strategies around the concept of “soft war”. But these facts 
do not in themselves elevate political rhetoric to theory.  
 
It is important to investigate the rhetoric and policies of the Islamic Republic—so I welcome 
Monroe Price’s essay “Iran and the Soft War” about the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic—but the 
analysis has to be done carefully and with analytic rigor to try to distinguish claims from fact and rhetoric 
from reality. There is much to say about the essay, but I will confine myself to three main issues: the 
nature of soft war as a concept, the dearth of empirical context and history, and the piece’s confusingly 
unapologetic relativism. 
 
I.    Is “Soft War” an Analytic Concept? 
 
It seems that Monroe [Price] himself cannot decide if soft war is a real theoretical concept or if it 
is a clever neologism coined by ideologues of the Islamic Republic and thus designated “soft war,” with 
quotation marks. The title of the piece suggests the former and even goes further, suggesting that there is 
something called (by whom?) “the soft war” (a construction that also implies that there are no others and 
this is the one). The mixed usage suggests indecision. 
 
So is soft war a serious analytical concept? Monroe goes to great pains to set out the Islamic 
Republic’s argument about “soft war”, supported by lengthy quotations—but never questions it. What is 
included under the rubric of “soft war” that couldn’t be included in the concept of “soft power”—itself a 
much-contested construct that has given way to a notion of “smart power”? Is anything distinguishable by 
function between “soft power” and “soft war”? Whose concept is it? More significantly, are any of the 
reasons given for the notion valid? 
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Monroe talks about “Iran,” rarely the Islamic Republic. But who comprises this Iran and how does 
it speak? Such usage conjures up a synecdochic whole or a homogeneous society, which the tumultuous 
events surrounding the Presidential election of 2009 showed to be a fantasy. Instead, it would be 
preferable to recognize this rhetoric as the ideological emanation of the Islamic Republic, more specifically 
coming from the parastatal IRGC—the Revolutionary Guards known inside Iran as Sepah Pasdaran— 
whose leaders have been key in the formulation of the concept and strategy of their “soft war.” 
 
And to whom is the idea of soft war addressed? Mainly, it appears that the concept is used as an 
internal weapon to justify further repression and surveillance, with the “external” threat cleverly 
transmuted into the internal threat and domestic critics redefined as enemy agents. The piece is silent 
about the severe internal politico-legal consequences of “soft war.” 
 
That the idea of “soft war” has had real political and foreign policy consequences is not in doubt. 
The question is whether political rhetoric, from any polity, should be taken as social theory without 
significant examination. 
 
II. A Lack of Context and History 
 
In many ways, the notion of “soft war” is merely another clever play on Western words by the 
Islamic Republic’s ideologues. Monroe seems unaware that there have been many such linguistic 
reconstructions. For example, Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” became Khatami’s “dialogue of 
civilizations”; Bush’s “axis of evil” became the Islamic republic’s “axis of resistance.”  So why shouldn’t 
“soft power” become “soft war”?  A response made to the demonstrations after the contested presidential 
election of 2009 was “velvet revolution.” Absent an acknowledgment of this ongoing subversion of 
Western political language by successive politicians of the Islamic Republic, this might appear to be an 
isolated episode—which it is not. The ongoing play with language suggests that the ideologues of the 
Islamic Republic pay considerable attention to Western foreign policy discourses and are adept at clever 
reformulations.  
 
Monroe Price makes mention of BBC Persian’s role, but again, without background. BBC Persian 
Radio was founded in 1940, BBC Persian Online has had a Web presence for many years and BBC Persian 
Television started broadcasting in January 2009. There is little doubt that the BBC Persian services have 
played a role in mediating British-Iranian foreign policy for the past 70 years, especially during times of 
crisis that include the 1979 revolution, when the institution was widely regarded as supporting the popular 
mobilization. There is no doubt that BBC Persian Television became, quite unplanned, embroiled in the 
2009 post-election politics. But it was the internal dynamics of widespread revulsion at the charade of the 
presidential election that precipitated the “green politics,” not the external broadcasts of BBC Persian 
Television.  
 
And Iran has also been in the business of international radio broadcasting since the 1950s under 
the Pahlavis. The Islamic Republic has invested heavily in developing new international broadcasting 
channels in different languages, including Arabic and English, with Press TV—its international English-
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language channel—established in early 2007. These channels are the ideological vehicles of the Islamic 
Republic. 
 
 Having set out the arguments made by the IRGC about soft war, one waited for some kind of 
analysis and rebuttal, a careful examination of the facts. These might have included the following:  
 
 Noting the difference between public service and state broadcasting. The BBC World 
Service is funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but maintains considerable 
editorial independence from its current paymaster. This arrangement will change in 
2014, when it will be funded through a license fee. Iranian foreign broadcasting is the 
mouthpiece of the regime and kept on an extremely tight ideological rein by the state. 
 
 Noting that the BBC has wanted to establish a Persian television channel since 2007, 
meaning that its initial broadcast in January 2009—the year of a presidential election—
was fortuitous, not deliberate. 
 
 Noting the Islamic Republic’s more than 30-year history of international broadcasting.  
 
 Noting the long history of broadcasting to Iran by the BBC World Service and other 
channels. 
 
 
III. Uncritical Relativism  
 
As media analysts unpack the self-serving propagandistic elements of Western political discourse, 
David Cameron’s “big society” notion comes to mind, so must we critically examine Iranian rhetoric. 
Analysis needs to be able to separate fact from fiction, loose verbiage from grounded theory. Monroe does 
not do that. 
 
When Naini, quoted at length by Monroe, talks about the “soft power” of the Iranian revolution, 
he is not using the term in the conventional manner to talk about foreign influence but rather in reference 
to the revolutionary solidarity of the 1979 movement; so the concept loses its international dimensions 
When Naini talks about “soft war,” he assumes that the enemy will win over the trust of the people, an 
unsubstantiated model of a “hypodermic needle” notion of media effects. One might ask, if the ideas of 
the revolution are strong and pervasive, why should the “enemy” win and why does Naini believe that it 
will? Or is this simply a self-serving justification for repression? Naini’s notion that the Internet could be 
“flooded” with Iranian content reveals an interesting naivete about the web. 
 
Why isn’t Ashena’s attempt to distinguish the three kinds of propaganda strategies of the BBC, 
again quoted at length, punctured as blather? Mainly, Ashena is concerned about the use of what one 
might call “citizen journalist” content emanating from inside Iran as scores of people sent text and images 
out during the post-election demonstrations. International channels, including the BBC, worked very hard 
to sort out and verify this material. Even a cursory discussion with such channels would reveal the 
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obfuscation of Ashena’s analysis. Ashena’s concern about “black propaganda” focuses on the reverse flow 
of messages from a wide range of sources that instructed Iranians about TOR and other tools to protect 
their privacy and security. This is fascinating rhetoric that tells us a great deal about the thinking of 
regime ideologues, including their particular understanding of the global digital environment—but requires 
careful exposition for any non-Iranian readership. 
 
“Soft war” is a clever neologism developed first in Persian, a potentially interesting idea that 
could be developed into a serious analytic concept. However, many of the claims by the Islamic Republic 
about “soft war” are propaganda. They are as amenable to factual clarification as the claims of some U.S. 
fascists, recently relayed by Press TV that the massacre of children at Sandy Hook was a Zionist plot 
hatched in anger at the UN’s recognition of Palestinian statehood. If this language and these claims are 
not questioned by critical media theorists, then we truly lose all ability to discriminate between valid 
argument and political bluster.  
 
And by the way, former Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, to this day a hero to many 
Iranians, was not assassinated, but instead died at home under house arrest many years after the 1953 
U.S./UK-engineered coup.  
 
All academic examination of Iran currently has to negotiate the Scylla of hostile Western 
interventionism and the Charybdis of the repressive Islamic Republic. Careful analysis of Iran, particularly 
at this tense and dangerous time, is to be welcomed, including that of nonspecialists, but a quick vault 
into the fray without 3-D spectacles is not. 
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